The Fate of Protest(ia): GAO and COFC Bid Protest Data is Actually Romantic

The holiday season is in full swing and many of us are finding time for relaxation and family. For me, that’s meant light reading, cooking, cozying by the fireplace with movies, and listening to Taylor Swift songs on repeat with my daughter. With the downtime and Swift’s music still bouncing around my head, I thought it would be the perfect time to provide a fresh take on some recent bid protest data.

Bid protests are an essential, yet often misunderstood, part of federal contracting. These procurement challenges allow disappointed contractors to question agency decision-making – in both the pre- and post-award context – when they believe procurement rules or regulations have been violated. If successful, protests can not only cure solicitation terms that are ambiguous, unduly restrictive, or contrary to law but also rectify organizational conflicts of interest, flawed technical or cost/price evaluations, and procurement decisions that lack a reasonable or rational basis.

But while bid protests continue to spark interest in newsrooms, on Capitol Hill, and even at dinner tables around the Beltway, there’s a growing narrative that the system is being overwhelmed by frivolous or excessive protests. Not so.

A deeper dive into the data from the U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO") and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ("COFC") tells a more nuanced story. One that challenges the notion that bid protests are derailing or halting the federal procurement process.

At first blush, the annual GAO data show a significant volume of protests (with a downward trend), and the COFC data shows a rise in cases. However, the way these bid protest numbers are calculated – and how the data can be interpreted – reveals a story that’s much more complex than a simple glance at the top-level data might suggest.

As Taylor Swift might say, the data is actually romantic because there's a hidden depth beneath the surface numbers that tells a much different story.

A Closer Look at the Data

Take, for example, the last five fiscal years (FY21 through FY25). At a glance, the protest numbers might appear overwhelming. GAO received 1,816, 1,595, 1,957, 1,740, and 1,617 protests, while COFC received 140, 123, 169, 266, and 234 protests, respectively. It’s easy to conclude that the sheer volume of protests is hampering the procurement system, and this narrative has gained some traction in procurement circles over the years.

But this conclusion misses a critical detail: the way these protest numbers are reported. Both GAO and COFC tally the number of individual protests or cases filed, not the number of challenged procurements. For example, each protest filed with the GAO is assigned a unique "B" number. If multiple parties file protests over the same procurement, or if a protester files supplemental protests over the course of a protest, those are counted as separate protests – resulting in an inflated count. [1] Similarly, at COFC, the protest count reflects the number of "cases filed," not the number of procurements under dispute. [2]

The result? The total number of protests is often far higher than the actual number of challenged procurements. For example, indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity ("IDIQ") contract vehicles, which are ubiquitous in federal contracting, often generate a dozen or more protests per procurement – sometimes even more. It's no surprise that these vehicles are heavily challenged. IDIQ awards – sometimes viewed as a "hunting license" – enable the awardees to compete against a smaller pool of competitors for hundreds of millions (or even billions) of dollars of goods and services.

In FY23, GAO reported a striking example: a single procurement – the NIH Information Technology Acquisition and Assessment Center, or NITAAC, CIO-SP4 – generated around 350 protests. At COFC, the same is happening: the court is currently dealing with more than 20 protests for the Department of Veterans Affairs' T4NG2 procurement. In other words, while GAO and COFC reported significant numbers of protests, the number of challenged procurements was drastically lower.

A Clearer Picture of Bid Protest Activity

As the chart shows, the number of reported bid protests may seem high, but the data doesn't accurately reflect the true number of procurements under dispute. And that’s not all. The protest data is romantic in three additional ways.

First, the number of protests that reach a decision on the merits is much lower than the total number of protests filed.

The GAO report states that, between FY21 and FY25, GAO issued merits decisions in 581, 455, 608, 386, and 380 cases, respectively. This means that, in FY25, the maximum number of protests that were sustained or denied that could have hit the 100-day limit established by the Competition in Contracting Act ("CICA") was under 400, compared to 1,617 protest filings. [3] Similarly, Fastcase data for FY25 shows that COFC issued around 120 opinions in protests, compared to just 234 cases filed. And although COFC decisions are not subject to a statutory time limit, COFC bid protests are typically prioritized (e.g., expedited briefing, bench decisions, and decisions within days of oral argument with a full memorandum opinion at a later date), meaning that they are often resolved within the four to five month range, or less. [4] Thus, to the extent that delays in the procurement process are a concern, the data is romantic because it confirms that, in spite of the volume of protest filings, only a small fraction of protests go through the full litigation process.

Second, the fact that such a small number of protests reach a decision on the merits also indicates that a significant number of protests are withdrawn, dismissed, or involve voluntary corrective action, all of which typically occur early in the process.

For example, using GAO's docket information in FY25, it appears that 139 protests were withdrawn and 695 protests were dismissed (both involve protests filed prior to the start of FY25). For corrective action, the GAO provides its effectiveness rate – i.e., the number of protests that result in corrective action or a sustain – which averaged 52% between FY21 and FY25. This means that of the 1,676 protests that GAO closed in FY25, roughly half – several hundred – were resolved through corrective action, which typically occurs before the 30-day mark when the record is due. [5] Similarly, while COFC does not publish an effectiveness rate, data reveal that the court received 234 protests and disposed of 247 cases, with around 120 published protest opinions (based on Fastcase data). Collectively, these data points illustrate that while a small number of protests reach a merits decision, the vast majority are withdrawn, dismissed, or involve corrective action. The data is therefore romantic because most protests are resolved in quick fashion, often in under a month. [6]

Third, the data do not differentiate between pre- and post-award protests.

For pre-award protests challenging the terms of a solicitation or the protester's exclusion from the competitive range, agencies are still permitted to evaluate proposals during the protest. The "CICA stay" only bars the procuring agency from making an award while a GAO protest is pending. [7] At COFC, where stays are negotiated (and thus are voluntary), the agency typically will only agree to withhold award during a pre-award protest. As a result, pre-award protests rarely cause meaningful delays to the procurement process – unless, of course, the agency doesn't take corrective action and GAO or COFC sustains the protest. Here, too, the data is romantic because it underscores the notion that protests don't always grind the proverbial procurement gears to a halt.

In sum, while the overall number of protest filings may appear high, a closer inspection of the data reveals that most protests are either: (a) dismissed, withdrawn, or result in corrective action, all of which typically occur around or before the date on which the record is due; or (b) involve pre-award solicitation challenges, whereby agencies are still allowed continue the process while the protest is pending. The data, in that respect, is actually romantic because just a small fraction of protests appear to cause significant disruptions or delays well beyond the date on which the record is due.

The Bottom Line

Bid protests are essential to a functioning – and trusted – federal procurement system. When procurements already operate on 12- to 18-month lifecycles (or longer), the addition of one to three months of protest activity at GAO – or one to five months at COFC – does not meaningfully slow or overly burden the procurement system. In fact, protest activity is often anticipated and built into agency procurement timelines.

Rather than being a driving force behind delay or dysfunction, bid protests serve as a crucial check against improper, unfair, or flawed agency decision-making and help ensure the procurement process remains fair and accountable. As the GAO and COFC data show, a clearer picture of the bid protest data isn't just sweet – it’s actually romantic.

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[1] See GAO Bid Protest Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2025 at 5 n.1.

[2] See Statistical Report for FY25 at 2 n.** (stating that "Pre-Award or Post-Award Bid Protest Injunction cases" are listed under figures are listed under “Contract/Injunction" statistics).

[3] See 31 U.S.C. § 3554(a)(1) (stating that GAO "shall issue a final decision concerning a protest within 100 days after the date the protest is submitted").

[4] Some of the larger, more complex procurements before the COFC sometimes take longer than six months to decide, but those types of bid protests are typically the exception, not the rule.

[5] While the number of protests filed was 1,617, GAO's effectiveness rate is based on the percentage of protests closed, which was 1,676 protests.

[6] The number of corrective actions at COFC is perhaps higher than the data indicate. Prior to filing a bid protest at COFC, the protester is required to notify the relevant parties of an incoming protest matter by submitting a pre-filing notice with the Court, the Contracting Officer, and Department of Justice. In light of this procedural step, corrective action sometimes takes place before a bid protest complaint even hits the court's docket.

[7] See 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c); see also FAR 33.104(b)(1).

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